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In most, if not all, formulations of TAG, the Christian God is the grounding, transcending Being who is to be demonstrated as preconditional (validly and necessarily presupposed) to all of human experience.

Simply put, no part of our experience, no tool of which we avail ourselves in order to think or believe correctly (such as the laws of logic or reasonable moral intuitions), no rightful sense of wonder or awe or love, is even possible, let alone explainable, apart from God’s existence. We cannot function, properly speaking, without God. Some presuppositionalists would argue that we cannot function correctly without presupposing the validity of the Christian world-view.

That has led some to question whether or not just *any* theistic or deistic entity will do with respect to meeting the criteria for a Being powerful enough or loving enough or grounding enough to be entailed as a necessary precondition for human experience.

“Fristianity” as a hypothetical religious or metaphysical system postulates that what is necessary for true belief in Christian theism may, in fact, be *more* than is absolutely required with respect to the set of ontic conditions required for our universe to be in place, for the laws of logic to be validated, and for truth, beauty, goodness, and love to be admirable or appreciable.

In future posts, I’d like to take a look at how Cornelius Van Til conceived a successful transcendental argument versus some of his followers and admirers. Also, I’d like to take a look at these formulations or conceptions with an eye to finding out the feasibility of “fristianity” as a generic objection to just an sort of claim that Christian theism is a necessary and sufficient condition for logic, morality, truth, goodness, or that it is preconditional to have a self-consistent and non-contradictory world-view.